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ABSTRACT 
In this article the process of developing a policy for the recent comprehensive r trenchment 
operation in the Dutch university system is analysed from a theoretical point of view on decision- 
making. The article especially addresses the question whether some empirical evidence can be 
found for the rationalist view of collective decision-making, which states that a process of social 
communication should eventually lead to a unanimous and rational consensus concerning the 
selection of the optimal policy. 
The actual analysis concerns the way a retrenchment policy has been developed in a process of 
social communication between the most important actors: the Minister of Education and Science 
and the thirteen Dutch universities. It is assumed that the various communicative linkages between 
these actors can be interpreted as a policy network in which both governmental nd. non-govern- 
mental actors operate. 
The article concludes that in the Dutch university policy-network a complicated balance of 
interdependencies exists and that several sub-networks can be distinguished. It is also concluded 
that the Minister, while recognizing the interdependencies in the network, was able to use a special 
kind of (negative) incentive, inducing the universities to act as he wished. 
This negative incentive steering, however, also persuaded the universities to go to the utmost 
in their consultation efforts, thus trying to reach the rationalist ideal of collective decision-making. 
The final conclusion therefore is that the rationalist view of collective decision-making does not 
appear to be unrealistic. The article ends with a warning against a common mistake made 
regarding the normative appearance of the rationalist perspective. 
1. Introduction 
In  the  l i te ra ture  on  dec is ion -mak ing  the  ra t iona l i s t  perspect ive  has an  
impress ive  h i s tory .  Its roots  can  be t raced  to the  empi r i c i s t  ph i losophers  o f  the  
* The case of the policy development process concerning the retrenchment operation in the 
Dutch university system in 1982 and 1983. 
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eighteenth century and even further back through the later Middle Ages to the 
Ancient Greeks, where the Olympic gods claimed to be far more "rational" than 
those other less civilised gods who had more affinity with primitive beliefs 
(Russell, 1971: 51). From the period of the Enlightenment on, the rationalist 
perspective has attracted philosophers and politicians who have tried to argue 
for a hypothetical rule of reason. As Mannheim (1968: 186) states: 
The role of reason in human affairs and the idea of the free individual s the seat of reason 
are the most important themes inherited by twentieth century social scientists from the 
philosophers ofthe enlightenment. 
In its simplest version the rationalist perspective is rarely doubted. The thesis 
that a man acts to maximize his values under the constraints he faces has hardly 
ever been challenged. 
Recently, however, some major challenges to the rationalist perspective 
have emerged. It is especially the complex decisions in governmental policy 
processes that seem to present some basic problems for the established perspec- 
tive. Moreover, according to some authors, an alternative perspective on deci- 
sion-making is being developed. From the fields of cybernetics and cognitive 
theory new insights are being provided which, taken together, are beginning to 
challenge the theoretical foundations of the rationalist perspective (Steinbruner, 
1974). 
The rationalist perspective is met in two fundamentally different versions: 
the positive version and the normative version. In its positive appearance the 
rationalist perspective consists of a set of assumptions for explaining or predict- 
ing how actual empirical decision processes proceed. In its normative appear- 
ance, the rationalist perspective consists of a set of statements on how decisions 
ought to be made. 
In this article I will mainly choose a positive orientation towards the 
rationalist perspective. After presenting a brief outline of the general features of 
this perspective, I will explore the level of realism of the central assumptions of 
the rationalist view on collective decision-making and policy development. 
These central assumptions concern the selection of a policy in a "community of 
discourse". 
To be able to explore the level of realism of these assumptions, I make use of 
the concept "policy-network". I will try to analyse a process of collective deci- 
sion-making and policy development in such a network. For this purpose a 
case-study is presented. This study coversthe policy development process during 
the retrenchment operation which occurred in the Dutch university system in 
1982 and 1983. 
After the analysis of this case-study, I formulate some conclusions about he 
process of policy development in the Dutch university policy network. Finally, I 
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will return to the rationalist perspective, formulating a conclusion about he level 
of realism of its positive appearance and a warning against a common mistake 
regarding its normative appearance. 
2. The Rationalist Perspective 
The most general postulate of the rationalist perspective holds that an 
individual decision-maker will try to maximize his values given the constraints of 
the situation. A rational decision-maker defines his values, analyses his informa- 
tion and selects that alternative from his set of options which provides him with 
the maximum value. 
Behind these general postulates of the rationalist perspective, a number of 
more specific assumptions can be found which have often been the object of 
heated debates. Let us explore some of the more fundamental discussions 
concerning the rationalist perspective. The normative appearance of this per- 
spective provides a good starting-point for such an exploration. 
What are the philosophical reasons for accepting the rationalist perspective as 
a normative guideline? To answer this question we address ourselves to Karl 
Popper, who clearly indicates that a choice for the rationalist perspective is a 
moral choice: 
The rationalist attitude is characterized by the importance it attaches to argument and 
experience. But neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rationalist atti- 
tude; for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have 
therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them (Popper, 1966: 230). 
Popper (1966: 280) also argues that the rationalist perspective is related to a 
secular view of man as maker of himself: "Instead of posing as prophets we must 
become the makers of our fate." 
A choice for the normative version of the rationalist perspective thus is a 
moral choice for a Promethean view of man. The normative version of the 
rationalist perspective incorporates a view of man as gaining mastery over 
himself by power of his faculty of reason. 
But there is more to this normative rationalist attitude. In the rationalist 
vision a decision may only be called rational if it is the result of an evaluation of 
all consequences of all alternatives. If we want to take a rational decision we thus 
need a complete image of all the possible consequences of all the available 
alternatives. Besides that, we, should be able to allocate weights to all these 
Consequences and alternatives, for only then are we able to select our "optimal" 
solution. For reasons of briefness let us follow Camhis' stylistic presentation of
the requirements of the rationalist perspective (Camhis, 1979: 30): 
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(1) A general set of values expressed as goals and objectives. 
(2) Generation and examination of all alternatives open for achieving the goals. 
(3) The prediction of all consequences that would follow from the adoption of each 
alternative. 
(4) The comparison of the consequences in relation to the agreed set of goals and 
objectives. 
(5) The selection of the alternative whose consequences correspond to a greater degree 
with the goals and objectives. 
Many authors have argued that trying to come to rational decisions in this way is 
unrealistic. A well-known argument is the one by Braybrooke and Lindblom 
(1970). They attack the rationalist perspective on some of the basic requirements 
mentioned above. They argue that formulating a coherent set of values is 
impossible, due to their fluidity and due to the fact that conflicts among values 
will always exist. Regarding the analysis of all alternatives and all consequences, 
they point at the inadequacies of theories and information gathering. Bray- 
brooke and Lindblom's conclusion is that the rationalist perspective is fruitless 
and unhelpful as an ideal because it does not "take into account he manifold 
difficulties ... that beset social analysts and evaluators in the real world" (Bray- 
brooke and Lindblom, 1970: 16). 
This is a positive argument against he rationalist perspective. Braybrooke 
and Lindblom describe a number of practices which differ widely from the 
normative rationalist ideal and which prove to be fruitful to their users when 
coping with the difficulties of decision-making. This makes their work very 
important, especially since several studies have endorsed their conclusions about 
the actual practices of decision-making (Wildavsky, 1974; Bailey and O'Connor, 
1975; Schulman, 1975). 
But the question is whether the finding that many actual decision processes 
do not resemble the rationalist ideal implies that the ideal therefore is not 
worthwhile. On this question opinions diverge. On the one hand there is a group 
of authors who seem to be convinced that the rationalist attitude should be done 
away with as soon as possible. Braybrooke and Lindblom (1970: 22, 23) are 
convinced that the rationalist attitude should no longer be considered as a 
normative guideline: 
In what sense do these systems represent worthy aspirations? Analysts typically do not hold 
the proposed methods to be worthy aspirations on grounds that within a few generations it 
will be possible to construct a rational-deductive system or a welfare function. Rather, they 
aspire to them in the belief that to be closer to achieving their construction is better than 
being farther away. They assume, first, that part of such a system is better than no part of the 
same system and, second, that part of such a system is better than any alternative realizable 
system. 
But, as we shall see, much of the attraction of these systems lies in their promise of 
comprehensiveness; and one can doubt the usefulness of quite incomplete rational-deduc- 
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tire systems orwelfare functions. Even more important is the principal thesis of this book -
that social analysts have in fact hit upon a mutually reinforcing and defensible s t of 
evaluative practices that, if clearly understood, would raise great doubts in their own mind 
as to whether the received i eals are worth aspiring to even as ideals. 
On the other hand, there is a group of authors who, although accepting the 
criticism on the rationalist perspective, are not willing to abandon the perspec- 
tive as a normative ideal. Etzioni, for example, has argued that the necessary 
calculations assumed in the rationalist perspective cannot be carried out. Firstly, 
the decision-makers donot have all the relevant information they would need to 
examine all consequences of all alternatives. Secondly, they do not know how 
much of the information they have is really necessary and/or valid (Etzioni, 
1968: 265). 
But Etzioni does not seem to completely reject he rationalist perspective as 
a normative ideal. He presents his model of"mixed scanning" as an adaptation 
of the rationalist perspective (Etzioni, 1968,: 282) and seems to hold on to what 
he feels is a less unrealistic rationalist ideal. In his own way Etzioni seems to 
express the same view as Simon, who calls his "satisfizing man" a modest cousin 
of the "maximizing man", this modesty being the result of the fact that the 
satisfizing man does not select he best alternative among all those available to 
him, but looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or "good enough" 
(Simon, 1976: xxix). 
Both Etzioni and Simon, and with them many other advocates of the 
rationalist perspective, frankly admit that the ultimate requirements of this 
perspective may be unrealistic. But they nevertheless want to hold on to the ideal, 
simply because itserves the process of justification of decisions (Solesbury, 1974: 
141). 
3. The Rationalist View of Collective Decision-making and Policy 
Development 
A special problem with the rationalist perspective comes to the foreground 
when it is applied to the process of collective decision-making and policy 
development. When more than one actor is involved in a process of decision- 
making, the rationalist requirement offormulating and integrating values must 
be shared by all those participating in the process. Also, the rationalist analysis of 
all consequences of all alternatives should take place in such a way that every 
participating actor can agree. However, there is more than one way of perceiving 
reality and there are many values an individual actor can pursue. In a process of 
policy development the various ubjective preferences and images therefore can 
differ widely (Ackoff and Emery, 1972). 
The rationalist view of collective decision-making and policy development 
598 
addresses this question of coordinating individual preferences and images in a 
special way. It states that a process of social communication should eventually 
lead to a unanimous and rational consensus concerning the selection of the 
optimal policy. This view can be traced back to the basic rationalist attitude, 
described by Popper (1966: 225) as the attitude of saying: "I may be wrong and 
you may be right, and by an effort we may get nearer to the truth." 
The rationalist view of collective decision-making involves the possibility 
of criticising both factual and value propositions. In an open process of social 
communication, the consequences of every proposition should be completely 
discussed so that finally an agreement can be reached on the policy which should 
be adopted. As such, the rationalist process of adopting a policy in a process of 
social communication may be compared to the process of adopting a proposi- 
tion in scientific research. 
... both propositions, which state facts, and proposals, which propose policies, including 
principles or standards of policy, are open to rational discussion. Moreover, a decision -
one, say, concerning the adoption of a principle of conduct - reached after the discussion of 
a proposal ... may be in many respects very similar to a decision to adopt, as the best 
available hypothesis, a proposition which states a fact (Popper, 1966: vol. II, 384, 385). 
Following Popper, Collingridge (1982) came to the conclusion that a rationalist 
approach to collective decision-making should be based on the fundamental 
conception that preference judgements, although impossible to justify, may be 
assessed by exposure to criticism in a rational discussion. 
Making a social choice is not finding some reasonable compromise between the fixed values 
of the individuals concerned. On the contrary, disagreement is resolved by some of the 
people involved in the decision changing their views about what their interests are, realizing 
that their original opinions about what the group should choose were mistaken. Each 
person tries to convince those in opposition to him that the option which really serves their 
individual interests is the one which he thinks serves his own. Thus debate and not 
compromise is the key to the making of social decisions (Collingridge, 1982; ix). 
It may be concluded that in the rationalist view of collective decision-making and 
policy development two conditions hould be met. The first is that there should 
be a "community of discourse" embracing all those concerned. The second is that 
this discourse should lead to an agreement concerning the selection of the 
optimal policy (Faludi, forthcoming, ch. 8). 
Again, opinions diverge as to whether this rationalist view of collective 
decision-making and policy development is an ideal that should be strived after 
or done away with. On the one hand there are, as Elster indicates, many authors 
who differ strongly in many respects, but who agree on the need for "purging the 
private, selfish or idiosyncratic preferences in open and public debate". They all 
agree on the central assumptions of the rationalist view of politics and policy- 
making: 
599 
The goal of politics should be unanimous and rational consensus, not an optimal compro- 
mise between irreducibly opposed interests. The forum is not to be contaminated by the 
principles that regulate the market, nor should communication beconfused with bargain- 
ing. From these contrasts it is easy to identify the writers I have in mind. They include 
Rousseau and Hegel, Hannah Arendt and Jtirgen Habermas... (Elster, 1983: 35). 
On the other hand are the authors who think that the rationalist view of 
collective decision-making and policy development is unrealistic and useless. 
Steinbruner, for instance, concludes that there are formidable logical barriers to 
extending the rationalist analysis of individual decision-making to the collective 
level (Steinbruner, 1974: 36). In criticising Habermas' ideal of discourse, Wein- 
rich explains that the formulation of the ideal itself can stimulate the participat- 
ing actors in a decision-making process to develop special strategies which make 
the ideal both unrealistic and unattainable and which eventually lead to the 
"dictatorship of the rear" (Weinrich, 1971). 
In the rest of this article I will concentrate on the question whether some 
empirical evidence can be found for the rationalist view of collective decision- 
making and policy development. I will introduce the concept "policy-network" 
as an institutional pproximation of the rationalist view of the "community of 
discourse". The analysis of an actual process of collective decision-making and 
policy development i  such a policy-network will hopefully provide us with some 
indications concerning the realism of the central assumptions ofthis rationalist 
view. 
4. Policy-networks 
In the 1960s the emphasis n organizational theory shifted from controlling 
internal activities to managing external constraints. Attention was paid to the 
various aspects of resource control and to the organization-environment inter- 
face, where the management of uncertainty was a prominent theme. Later on, 
the collaborative agreements between organizations and the various coordi- 
nation strategies became important issues and a conceptual consensus was 
developed on the nature of "networks", which were described as a composition 
of organizations connected by a certain type of relationship (Aldrich, 1979; 
Aldrich and Whetten, 1981). 
Whetten (1982: 107-108) notes that in organization theory three principal 
dimensions have so far been used in characterizing etworks: 
1. Centrality. This is the number and the length of all linkages between one organization 
and all other organizations in the network. 
2. Complexity. The extent of functional dissimilarity of goals, services, products, or target 
populations among organizations in the network. This is sometimes referred to as domain 
similarity or functional differentiation. 
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3. Density. The extent o which members of a population or network are directly linked to 
one another. This is also referred to as cohesion or connectedness. 
In several other disciplines a related conceptual development took place. In 
social systems theory, an "actor-oriented systems analysis" appeared in which 
"social action systems" are presented as systems that shape and transform the 
conditions for social activity. 
Social action systems consist of patterned social action and interaction, which are Shaped 
and influenced by - at the same time that they produce, reproduce, and transform -
material, social structural, and cultural constraints (Baumgartner tal., 1978: 40). 
In policy analysis ome attempts were made to develop aconceptual framework 
which is very much akin to the organizational network approach. Critiquing 
traditional policy analysis as "mono-centric", Gregg, for instance, pleads for an 
approach in which a network-like perspective can be found. In this perspective: 
decisions are regulated by the exercise of concurrent powers among semi-autonomous 
officials rather than by the exercise of hierarchical powers inferred by a single encompassing 
government or department (Gregg, 1976: 64). 
In urban and regional planning, both the study of the interaction of networks in 
an urban setting (Warren et al., 1974) and the analysis of the vertical interactions 
between semi-autonomous actors and different levels of government (Friend et 
al., 1974) should be mentioned. 
Recently, in public administration the network concept has also come to the 
fore. Milward and Francisco (1983) trace the emergence of this concept back to 
the concept of "subsystem politics", originally defined as: 
... the politics of function, involving the interrelations of bureaux and other administrative 
operating agencies, the counterpart congressional committee structure, and the interest 
organizations, trade press, and lobbyists concerned with a particular area or programme 
specialization (Redford, 1969: 83). 
Subsystem politics is also known under names as "the triple alliance" and "the 
iron triangle", indicating that in this form of policy-making executive organiza- 
tions, legislative committees and interest groups are strongly interrelated. In 
many western nations subsystem politics - Lowi speaks of "interest group 
liberalism" - has to a considerable extent replaced traditional party politics in the 
process of policy development, leading to an increasing professionalisation f 
policy-making and to the rise of single-issue interest groups. A major develop- 
ment following this professionalisation a d the rise of interest groups is the 
emergence of "policy-networks" (Heclo, 1978; King, 1978). 
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The policy-network consists of all those interested in the benefits that may flow from a 
policy domain, but not all of its members are capable of affecting the distribution of the 
benefits. 
The policy-network constitutes a form of social network in the sense used by social 
anthropologists in that it is shaped by patterns of relations in which each individual has 
developed a communication linkage with at least one other member of the network, but is 
not necessarily fully connected to every other member. 
In the policy-network the unit of analysis consists of individuals, parts of organizations and 
coalitions of organizations. 
The character of the network is formed in part by the extent of "indirect administration" in 
which the ... government assumes relatively few administrative functions (Milward and 
Francisco, 1983: 283-285). 
Trying to relate to the conceptual innovations in the various disciplines menti- 
oned, I will speak of a policy-network as a system characterized by the following 
components: 
9 a set of actors (individuals, parts of organizations, organizations, coalitions of 
organizations); 
9 a set of activities, problems or issues with respect o which the actors have 
certain interests and goals; 
9 a set of norms, rules and assumptions, defining the situations in which the 
actors interact and communicate, and defining the forms of interaction and 
communication the actors have at their disposal; 
9 the distribution of the action, interaction and communication possibilities 
among different actors or categories of actors; 
9 the set of likely outcomes (costs and benefits) of the actions, interactions and 
communications for the different actors or categories of actors. 
Besides these components some specific characteristics of a policy-network can 
be mentioned. 
1. A policy-network consists of actors who try to influence (to use Easton's 
words) the authoritative allocation of values. These values may be rewards 
(financial resources, services, status) or deprivation (punishment, iaxation, 
budget cuts, status denigration). 
2. The actors of a policy-network can in various ways be interrelated. When 
many interrelations exist the network may be called "dense". The nature of the 
interrelations may differ from cooperation towards competition and conflict. 
3. Policy-networks may have either a more or less permanent, or a temporary 
character. Aldrich and Whetton (1981) distinguish "networks" and "action 
sets", a network being more permanent than an action set. I will speak of 
permanent and temporary policy-networks. 
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4. A policy-network consists of governmental s well as non-governmental 
actors. In general the governmental ctors leave the administrative functions 
to the other actors in the network. "Policy-network comprise a set of inter- 
organizational relations that receives a mandate from the state to act in its 
name in a limited area and to allocate state funds" (Milward and Francisco, 
1983: 285). 
5. The linkages between the actors of a network can be horizontal as well as 
vertical. However, in a policy-network the emphasis will be on the horizontal 
linkages, making traditional bureaucratic or corporate coordination by 
means of centralised authority of little value. 
6. The configuration of power in a policy-network may vary from oligarchy to 
anarchy. Often a dominant coalition of actors will be found, which may be 
characterized as a polycentric power configuration. Polycentricity refers to a 
pattern where the power is distributed over many interdependent but relative- 
ly autonomous actors. 
7. A special type of relation between the actors of a policy-network has to do 
with resources. Resources may be conceived as the elements which an actor 
requires to meet his conditions for survival or performance (financial resour- 
ces, authority) (Benson, 1982). The resource dependencies between the actors 
of a policy-network to a large extent define the power configuration of that 
network. 
If we recapitulate some of the central characteristics of the concept of "policy- 
network" we may justifiably come to the conclusion that a policy-network can be 
seen as an operational elaboration and an institutional approximation of the 
rationalist ideal of collective decision-making and policy development by means 
of the "community of discourse". When we realize that interaction and commu- 
nication are of extreme importance in a policy-network and, moreover, when we 
pay attention to the prevalence in a policy-network of horizontal linkages and 
polycentric power configurations, we may agree that a process of policy develop- 
ment in a policy-network should be able to provide us with some interesting 
empirical notions for a positive orientation towards the collective rationalist 
perspective. 
In the literature on policy analysis and especially on policy instruments, we 
find an interesting argument for this point of view. Several authors (Mitnick, 
1980; Hood, 1983; Mayntz, 1983) have argued that the selection of a policy 
instrument by a governmental organization should be contingent on the context 
it will be used in. They suggest hat a governmental organization, when con- 
fronted with a group of actors in a policy-network, should rely more on indirect 
types of instruments (persuasion, incentives) than on direct actions. 
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The power of these [actors of a policy-network] rests on the control they have over their 
members... The government in particular can avail itself of this control by getting an 
organization tosupport a policy decision affecting its .members... The indirect mode of 
control established in this way lies at the core of what has recently been widely discussed as
"neo-corporatism" (Mayntz, 1983: 140). 
The preference for indirect ypes of instruments in policy-networks may be 
interpreted as another argument for choosing a policy development process in a 
policy-network as an approximation of the collective rationalist ideal. Paraph- 
rasing Mayntz, we could say that the very use of these instruments in a policy- 
network is predicated upon the assumption of the existence of a situation where 
the various actors tend to have the best possibilities for a genuine discourse, 
leading to the selection of the optimal policy (Mayntz, 1983: 140). 
5. The Dutch University System 
The Dutch university system consists of thirteen institutions, with a total 
enrollment of 140,000 to 150,000 studefits. Each institution is organizationally 
autonomous, all institutions are equal in the sense that they all offer students the 
opportunity to acquire a master's degree, and that all of them are entitled to let 
students write a thesis and acquire a PhD. There are six general state universities, 
organized as public authorities. Furthermore there are three technical state 
universities and one agricultural state university. Finally, three general universi- 
ties are private institutions. 
Together the universities offer a broad range of curricula. The larger 
universities contain ten to fifteen different faculties, which in turn encompass 40 
to 50 different subfaculties or departments. 
The universities also have an important research task, which is of great 
social and scientific value. In general the initiative to undertake research comes 
from the researchers themselves. The financing of research takes place through 
various funding procedures. Of the nearly 37,000 people employed by the 
universities, approximately 50% of them are scientific personnel. 
The national government provides almost 100% of the financial resources 
of all institutions. Together the universities receive about f4,000,000,000 
($1,300,000,000) per year from the national government. Compared to this, all 
other sources of university income are negligible. About 75% of the financial 
resources provided by government is used for personnel costs. 
The relationships between government and the universities are direct and 
regulated by several laws. The universities are completely autonomous inmanag- 
ing their internal affairs, especially regarding the activities of teaching and 
research. The government can influence the system using funding methods and 
special regulations concerning the overall structures of teaching and research. 
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Unti l  the middle  of  the 1970s, the funding of  the universit ies was on a 
year-to-year basis. The funding of both teaching and research activities was 
based on the student enrollment figures. However, as Fig. 1 indicates, student 
enrollment figures began to fall and since more drastic enrollment declines are 
forecasted, new ways of funding are now being developed. 
The enrollment declines, together with many other economic and social 
developments, have forced the government and the universities to develop new 
policies concerning the overall operation of the university system. The period of 
growth seems to be over. The university system will have to come to terms with 
the "three r's of the 1980s: reduction, reallocation, and retrenchment" (Peterson, 
1981). 
On 16 November 1981 the Dutch Minister of Education and Science wrote 
a letter to parliament indicating that the way by which the budget cuts in the 
university system until then had been realised (by means of pro rata) was no 
longer acceptable. A new way of cutting down the expenses in the university 
system hadto be found. This date marks the beginning of an important and far 
reaching retrenchment operation in the Dutch university system. I will describe 
the policy development process concerning this operation in detail below. First, 
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Fig. 1. Student enrollment in the Dutch university system. 
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however, I will try to indicate that the steering of this process was in the hands of 
many actors, who together formed a policy-network. 
6. The Dutch University Policy-Network 
Who then are the actors involved in the process of policy development that 
occurred uring the retrenchment operation in the Dutch university system? Of 
course, the most important actors are the Minister of Education and Science on 
the one hand, and the thirteen universities on the other. But to get a more 
complete picture, we have to look closer. Let us try to make an inventory of all 
the actors involved and of their various interrelations. 
The Minister of Education and Science has the formal political responsibili- 
ty for the functioning of the university system. He has the authority to allocate 
tasks and resources to the universities by means of the funding instrument. This 
authority isbased on the "law concerning scientific education" (WWO), enacted 
in 1960. A decision concerning an allocation or reallocation of tasks is taken by 
the minister, after having consulted with the universities and after having heard a 
special advisory council known as the Academic Council. 
The Academic Council is an organization i stituted by law in which all the 
universities are represented. Itsobjective is to maintain the horizontal coordina- 
tion between the universities in order to be able to advise the Minister of 
Education and Science. In practice, the universities often use the Council to try 
to persuade the minister to satisfy their wishes. 
To perform his tasks, the Minister of Education and Science has at his 
disposal the Department ofEducation and Science. Within this department it is 
the "Directorate-General for Higher Education and Scientific Research" 
(DGHW), which to a large extent is oriented towards the university system. With 
regard to the retrenchment operation, which will be described below, within this 
directorate-general a special taskforce was created. 
The thirteen universities are all governed by their own boards and councils. 
These two bodies are responsible for the university policies concerning the 
teaching and research activities and concerning the personnel and material 
resources. The university board acts as the daily committee; the university 
council decides on the general policy lines. Within each university, the various 
faculties and subfaculties organize, manage and realize the programs for teach- 
ing and research. 
Between the universities several forms of consultation exist. Most of these 
consultation activities are directed towards the coordination of individual poli- 
cies, to be able to face the minister jointly. The most important consultation 
bodies of the universities are: 
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9 the Academic Council 
9 the college of the vice-presidents for academic affairs 
9 the general assembly of the presidents 
9 the consultation of the portfolio-holders of finance 
9 the consultation of the portfolio-holders of planning 
9 the consultation of the portfolio-holders of research 
9 the consultation of the portfolio-holders of personnel 
9 the consultation of the portfolio-holders of building and housing 
Only the consultation ofthe portfolio-holders of planning has a certain formal 
status. This consultation body, called the "Permanent Planning Committee" 
(PPC), is an official committee of the Academic Council. 
Of all the consultation bodies mentioned, the meetings of the portfolio- 
holders of planning and of personnel appeared to be the most important for the 
recent retrenchment operation. This can be explained by the fact that these 
portfolio-holders play an important role in the consultation processes inwhich 
the minister also participates. 
The consultation processes between the Minister of Education and Science 
(or his representatives) on the one hand and the universities on the other hand are 
institutionalised in several bodies. For our purposes, the consultation bodies for 
planning and personnel are the most important. 
Let us first make an inventory of the consultation bodies on the subject of 
planning. The first consultation body that should be mentioned inthis respect is
the "Multi-lateral Consultation Organ" (MLO). The MLO is not really an 
official organ with appointed members. It is rather a general forum where the 
minister and the universities negotiate - among other things - the national 
budget for scientific education and research. 
A second consultation body is the "Planning Consultation Organ" (POO). 
This is an official body which is composed of thirteen representatives of the 
universities, twelve representatives of the schoois for higher vocational educa- 
tion (an important sector of the system of higher education i the Netherlands, 
not dealt with in this article) and several advisors and observers, among whom 
are representatives of the minister. In the POO procedural questions are mainly 
discussed, especially those concerning the methods and criteria for allocating 
funds. 
The meetings of the POO are prepared by the "Advice Group for Planning" 
(AGP). This group acts as the agenda committee for the POO. The members of 
the AGP are appointed by the minister after nomination by the POO. Usually 
the members of the PPC, the consultation body of the portfolio-holders of
planning (see above), are also AGP members. The AGP often establishes 
taskforces to study special policy problems. 
For matters of personnel, two important consultation bodies exist. First 
607 
there is the "Consultation Organ for Personnel Affairs in Scientific Education" 
(OPWO). In this body the portfolio-holders of personnel of the universities 
discuss personnel matters with the appropriate officials of the Department of 
Education and Science. 
Also, the "Central Consultation Organ for Personnel Affairs in Scientific 
Education" (COPWO) should be mentioned. This body operates as an offical 
consultation organ with the trade unions. In the COPWO four different union 
federations on government-personnel affairs are represented. The Department of 
Education and Science also has some official representatives in this organ. 
Looking at the various actors and their interrelations mentioned, we may 
speak of a policy-network. In this network both governmental nd non-govern- 
mental actors are involved. The main actors are the Minister of Education and 
Science and his department, and the thirteen universities. The Department of 
Education and Science and the universities are linked by a complicated pattern 
of relations. Neither the minister and his representatives, nor the universities are 
able to steer the policy processes completely according to their own will. The 
minister may try to initiate certain policy processes; for their actual implementa- 
tion he cannot do without the cooperation of the universities, which have the 
right to veto certain decisions of the minister. 
The relations between the actors in the network are elaborated in the 
horizontal linkages in the various Consultation bodies. In these bodies the actors 
have to come to an agreement concerning the policies that should be adopted. 
The communicative linkages between the actors are supposed to lead to the 
policy decisions that every actor can agree on. Direct communication and 
interaction play an important role in this whole setting. 
7. The Policy Development Process during the Retrenchment Operation in the 
Dutch University System in 1982 and 198311] 
On 16 November 1981, the Minister of Education and Science wrote a letter 
to parliament. In this letter the minister declared that a severe cutback in the 
funds for the university system was inevitable. However, the national research 
efforts needed to be maintained. The retrenchment would take place by reallo- 
cating tasks between the universities. The minister indicated that the budget cuts 
would rise from 20 million guilders in 1983, to 60 million guilders in 1986. If more 
cutbacks were necessary, they would be realized by a more comprehensive 
reallocation of tasks. 
The minister aised this matter in the MLO and in the POO. Already at the 
11 December meeting of the PPC of the joint universities, a choice was offered: 
the universities could either try to defend the existing situation, claiming that 
budget cuts were impossible, or they could try to anticipate the new develop- 
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ments and themselves start to discuss the possibilities of a reallocation of tasks. 
The PPC did not come to a definite conclusion. The governing boards of the 
thirteen universities were asked to give their opinions. On 2 March 1982, the 
AGP - the agenda committee of the POO - established a taskforce to explore the 
procedures that could be followed for a reallocation of tasks. The taskforce 
began to work on a report. In the meetings of the COPWO and the OPWO the 
employment aspects of a reallocation of tasks were discussed. In the COPWO a 
plea was made to develop a social policy related to the retrenchment operation. 
On 7 July, the report of the taskforce of the AGP was published. Three 
models concerning the administrative elaboration of the reallocation of tasks 
were presented. In the first model the minister took a number of successive 
decisions on the reallocation of tasks; in the second he developed a reallocation 
plan and discussed this with the Academic Council; in the third model the 
universities jointly established a "reallocation organ" which would give advice on 
a plan for the reallocation of tasks. 
In the August meeting of the PPC, an agreement was reached concerning 
the third model. The universities would establish a "reallocation organ" which 
would give advice on a reallocation plan. In the meeting of the MLO, the 
minister declared that he would take note of the preference of the universities 
concerning the three models. He also declared, however, that he would develop 
his own reallocation plan if the universities were not able to provide him with 
their reallocation advice before 1 March 1983. Moreover, he indicated that 
severe budget cuts could be expected if the reallocation advice from the universi- 
ties did not satisfactorily deal with the problem. 
On 1 September, the minister published his official document, called "Task 
Reallocation and Concentration i  Scientific Education". This document be- 
came known as the TVC Report and from then on the whole operation was 
called the TVC operation. The report pointed out that the budget cuts would 
have to be more severe than expected. Instead of 20 million guilders in 1984 and 
60 million guilders in 1986, the cuts would rise from 66 million guilders in 1984 
up to approximately 258 million guilders in 1987. The suggestion was made that 
35% to 40% of the total cuts would be in the costs of the medical faculties and the 
academic hospitals. 
In a letter the minister asked the universities to inform him as to their 
preferences concerning the administrative elaboration of the whole operation. 
After a discussion in the PPC, the universities responded in a letter dated 
27 September and the reallocation organ, called the TVC committee, was estab- 
lished. The members of the TVC committee were nearly all portfolio-holders of
planning in their own university, and thus also members of the PPC. 
The TVC committee started its activities on 8 October. Exactly one year 
after the minister wrote his first letter tO parliament, 16 November 1982, the TVC 
committee published its first report. In this report various types of reallocation 
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were distinguished and a general procedure for the whole operation was pro- 
posed. The universities agreed with this procedure and the committee continued 
its work which included iscussing some matters with the minister. The minister 
wrote a letter to the committee, xplaining that he would test the final proposals 
of the committee against some general criteria. 
In the meetings of the organs on personnel affairs (OPWO and COPWO) 
some problems arose concerning the social policy which would have to be 
developed in relation to the TVC operation. On 7 March 1983 the minister wrote 
a long letter to the COPWO, indicating that concrete agreements would have to 
be made. 
In the meantime, the minister eceived approval for this decisions in parlia- 
ment. In the meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Education and Science 
of 24 February 1983, nearly all parties supported the general policy of the 
minister. 
The final report of the TVC committee was published on 11 March 1983. 
After many consultations with the boards of each university, the committee 
appeared to have succeeded in drawing up advice which received the support of 
all the universities. The only part that failed was the set of proposals for the 
medical faculties and the academic hospitals. Having finished its task, the TVC 
committee ceased to exist: 
After a few weeks the minister formulated his first reactions. He praised the 
committee for the solid way in which it had performed its tasks. But he also 
indicated that the proposed concentration ofactivities was not enough, and he 
developed some alternative proposals. The universities were shocked. In a letter 
of 12 April from the PPC to the minister the universities expressed their alarm. 
They also indicated that a greater concentration factivities, as proposed in the 
reaction of the minister to the report of the TVC committee, was unacceptable 
due to the great personnel problems that would be involved. On 14 April an 
informal meeting between the minister and the universities took place and the 
problems were resolved. 
In the meantime ach university formulated an official reaction to the 
advice of the TVC committee and sent it to the minister. The officials of the 
Department ofEducation and Science started working on the "concept of policy 
intentions" that was to be discussed with each university separately. A policy 
intention is a final agreement between the minister and a university on all 
possible measures concerning the functioning of that university, except for a 
measure to alter the curriculum. 
For the medical faculties and the academic hospitals there were still no 
agreed proposals. The minister made a first general proposal and in an informal 
meeting with the minister the universities (including the academic hospitals) 
agreed to respond to the minister's uggestion before 31 May. On 17 May, the 
minister published his concept of policy intentions, which still contained several 
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modifications of the proposals originally made by the TVC committee. The 
officials of the Department ofEducation and Science now started agreat number 
of bilateral and multilateral consultations with the universities. An agreement 
had to be reached with each university concerning the policy intentions. These 
consultations went on until 15 June. Little progress was made concerning the 
medical faculties and the academic hospitals. There was still no plan when a 
formal meeting with the minister took place on 16 June. The boards of the 
universities declared that a completed plan would be provided before 25 August. 
In the beginning of July the minister sent the concept of policy intentions 
statement to the universities, asking them to let him know before 20 August if 
they would give their agreement. On 13 July, the minister also sent his policy 
intentions to parliament. These intentions contained the concept proposals 
discussed with the universities, as well as a number of proposals to end the 
funding of certain activities. In the summer some problems arose concerning the 
personnel aspects of the whole operation. In a COPWO meeting the union 
federations broke off the consultation process. During a meeting of the Parlia- 
mentary Committee of Education and Science on 12 August, the minister was 
advised to reopen the negotiations with the union federations. This aspect apart, 
parliament remained supportive of the proposals. However, by the end of the 
summer of 1983 there was still no plan for retrenchment i  the medical faculties 
and the academic hospitals and consultations continued. 
Meanwhile the various university councils discussed the concept of policy 
intentions and finally eleven of the thirteen universities decided to conclude an 
agreement. 
The consultations with the union federations started again in September 
and on 11 November an agreement was reached and a social policy established. 
On 16 November, parliament discussed the policy intentions. In general parlia- 
ment agreed with the various intentions. There was, however, avote concerning 
the proposed closing down of a dental surgery curriculum. The minister was 
asked not to go on with this proposal but he ignored the vote. 
On 15 December, the minister sent his final tasks-reallocation plan to 
parliament. With this final document the process of policy development concern- 
ing the retrenchment operation in the Dutch university system ended. 
8. Conclusions 
The policy development process described above makes clear that in the 
Dutch university policy-network a complicated balance of interdependencies 
exists. The description of the policy development process also indicates that in 
this process several subnetworks with different characteristics were involved 
(Grondsma, 1983). 
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First there is the subnetwork in which both the minister and the universities 
participate. In this subnetwork the interdependency between the minister and 
the universities is very clear. The minister has the official authority to allocate 
funds and tasks. The universities have the competence to organize (and start and 
end) teaching and research activities. The minister mainly acts as the provider of 
state funds. The universities perform the administrative functions for realizing 
the teaching and research activities. The minister depends on the universities 
regarding the operational activities in the university system. The universities 
depend on the minister egarding the funding of those activities. 
Both actors in this subnetwork depend on one another to reach their 
comm6n goal: the production of high-grade scientific education and research. 
This common goal binds them together. But each actor also has his own interest, 
which conflicts with the other actor's interest. The minister is committed to 
perform the budget cuts in the university system, because of the decisions made 
in the cabinet council and in parliament. The universities will always try to 
prevent he budget cuts because of their inclination to maximise their budgets. 
In this subnetwork two important consultation bodies exist where the two 
actors try to reach an agreement with one another: the MLO and the POO. Both 
these organs are poorly institutionalised. The MLO only functions as a forum 
for consultation, where no decisions can be taken. In the POO decisions can be 
taken, but the minister is not obliged to keep his word. 
The rules of the game are rather vague and, looking at the history of the 
policy development process described, it seems that the minister has been able to 
take advantage of this situation. After the universities had declared that they 
wanted to establish a reallocation organ (the "TVC committee") to advise on a 
joint reallocation plan, the minister threatened that he would make more severe 
cuts if this advice were insufficient. Besides that he did not just accept he final 
advice of the TVC committee; he formulated several modification proposals and 
succeeded in getting the universities to accept hese proposals. 
A second subnetwork which appeared to be important in the policy devel- 
opment process is the personnel subnetwork. In this network the main actors 
were the minister and the union federations. They discussed the social policies 
that should be related to the retrenchment decisions. 
In this setting no direct interdependencies exist. Both actors only communi- 
cate with one another because they are obliged to by an offical order in council. 
The consultation activities therefore mainly had the character of a formal 
negotiation process, in which finally an agreement could be reached. 
A last, and very special, subnetwork isthe reallocation organ established by 
the joint universities: the TVC committee. In this committee the thirteen univer- 
sities are the actors. The committee isa temporary policy-network. After having 
produced its final report, the committee ceased to exist. 
In principle the interests of the actors in this network conflict: when one 
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university could be forced to accept a greater cutback, another university could 
have the advantage of a smaller cutback. In the process it appeared, however, 
that the universities were able to emphasize their common interests. The advice 
of members of the committee could be supported by each university. 
It is quite possible that the fact that the minister was seen as the "common 
enemy" triggered the universities' olidarity. The minister had threatened severe 
cutbacks if the universities would not themselves produce a concept plan. The 
universities decided not to let the minister interfere with the reallocation of tasks. 
Had they not decided in this way, the minister could have acted as he pleased, 
and he could have accused the universities of not being able to draw up a plan for 
their own future. 
In all three subnetworks intensive forms of interaction and communication 
are found. As such it may be concluded that the policy development process 
during the retrenchment operation in the Dutch university system took shape 
through several processes of interaction and communication. As far as the 
relationships between the actors in the various subnetworks are concerned, it
should be noted that several interdependencies exist and that the horizontal 
linkages seem to prevail over the vertical inkages. 
There is one special relationship which appeared to be of conclusive impor- 
tance for the whole process: the relationship between the minister and, the 
universities. From the analysis of the policy development process, it may be 
concluded that the minister, while recognizing the interdependencies in the 
network, was able to use a special kind of incentive to induce the universities to 
act in a way he thought was fruitful. The minister used his financial powers to let 
the universities themselves design the policy proposals for the retrenchment 
operation. By formulating the financial constraints that should be met and by 
threatening more severe budget cuts in the case of failure, the minister used the 
strategy of "cheque-book government": 
The great advantage of cheque-book government, as opposed to the other kinds of effectors 
available to government, is that it can be used to further purposes which government cannot 
completely specify not merely to secure obedience or compliance, but to induce its subjects 
to positive or creative activity or to choose the best means of achieving some broadly 
specified goal (Hood, 1983: 52). 
The minister used his strategy in a negative form. The minister may be said to 
have used a form of negative incentive steering. He threatened to punish the 
other actors in his policy subnetwork: if they did not behave as he wished, they 
might be confronted with the negative consequences of their refusal. 
This negative incentive steering strategy persuaded the universities to act 
jointly. Because of the threat of the minister, the universities did their utmost o 
reach a complete consensus concerning their advice on the reallocation of tasks. 
The fact that one actor in one subnetwork was able to use a negative incentive 
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strategy made thirteen actors in another subnetwork (the TVC committee) 
decide to go to the utmost in their consultation efforts. 
9. A Final Note on the Rationalist Perspective 
Where does this lead us with relation to the rationalist view on collective 
decision-making and policy development? Does the analysis of the policy devel- 
opment process in the Dutch university policy-network provide us with some 
empirical evidence for the rationalist view on collective decision-making and 
policy development? 
If there is some empirical evidence in this case-study, it must be found in the 
activities of the temporary subnetwork of the joint universities. Both other 
subnetworks certainly cannot be characterised as a "community of discourse", 
where in an open debate an optimal policy is agreed upon. These two subnet- 
works rather appear to be settings for negotiation and bargaining, where every 
actor tries to protect and to pursue his own interests. 
Whether the discussions in the subnetwork of the thirteen universities did or 
did not proceed according to the rationalist view, is hard to tell. A set of in-depth 
interviews with the members of the TVC committee could perhaps hed some 
light on this matter. It can be concluded, however, that a number of conditions 
for a "community of discourse" certainly existed. The social communication 
process could take place in a rather elaxed atmosphere, because the members of 
the TVC committee knew each other well from the PPC. The negative incentive 
steering strategy of the minister also induced the members of the committee to 
explore as many alternatives and consequences a possible and to finally design 
an optimal concept-plan under the constraints they were facing. 
The conclusion must be that in one of the three subnetworks analysed, the 
rationalist view of collective decision-making and policy development does not 
appear to be unrealistic. A comprehensive analysis of the discussions and 
debates in this subnetwork is necessary to be able to formulate a more definite 
conclusion. 
Finally, several authors have argued that the rationalist perspective is fruit- 
less because it is an unrealistic ideal (see above). In the case-study presented here, 
however, some indications were found that the rationalist view of collective 
decision-making and policy development can be met within an empirical policy 
development process. The perspective does not seem to be as unrealistic as some 
authors are inclined to believe. 
But, perhaps more importantly, the results of a positive analysis of the 
rationalist perspective cannot provide us with any argument concerning the 
question whether this perspective is worthwhile. I therefore do not formulate any 
conclusion regarding this question. The results of the case-study on the policY 
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development process concerning the retrenchment operation in the Dutch uni- 
versity system should not tempt us to conclude that the rationalist perspective is, 
or is not, worthwhile as a normative guideline. The only conclusion which seems 
to be correct is that, as a set of positive assumptions, the rationalist perspective is 
not unrealistic. 
As indicated above, several authors have come to the opposite conclusion. 
Moreover, many of them have declared that the rationalist perspective is there- 
fore not worthwhile as a normative guideline. However, there is no reason at all 
to abandon the rationalist ideal when some, or even many, empirical decision 
processes appear to differ from this ideal. There also is no reason to try to adapt 
the ideal to the experiences in actual decision processes. As a matter of fact, such 
adaptations only make the normative ideal less worthwhile, because the result is 
a strange mixture of methodological rules and practical experiences. 
When a positive analysis of the rationalist assumptions brings us to the 
conclusion that these assumptions are not supported by empirical evidence, we 
can try to explain why such empirical evidence is lacking. We can try to develop a
theory concerning the lack of this evidence, that is: concerning the question why 
in practice decision processes do not follow the rationalist assumptions. 
To use the lack of empirical evidence concerning the assumptions of the 
rationalist perspective to attack the perspective as a normative guideline is a 
mistake. An empirical analysis can never prove a normative ideal to be right or 
wrong. As a normative guideline the rationalist perspective cannot be falsified by 
empirical tests, as a hypothesis can be falsified by empirical tests. As a normative 
guideline the rationalist perspective is a methodological theory. 
That this mistake is often made can be concluded from the amusing little 
quarrel between Lakatos and Popper. In his "Replies to my critics" Popper 
mentions a question which Lakatos once asked him: "But is your own theory of 
falsibility ... falsifiable?" Popper (1974: 1010) replies as follows: 
Now, while this is a very natural question, it should not be asked by anybody familiar with 
my work. For the answer is that my theory is not empirical, but methodological or 
philosophical, and it need not therefore be falsifiable. 
As regards the normative appearance of the rationalist perspective, we should 
hold on to the same view: as a normative guideline the rationalist perspective is a 
methodological theory; it cannot be empirically falsified. 
Notes 
This paragraph to a large extent is based on: T. Grondsma, TVC-proces en speltheorie, Delft, 
The Netherlands, December 1983 
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